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I.

Abstract
This thesis is a microeconomic study of labor unions and a business analysis of a

professional sports industry. It will examine the effects of the salary cap in the National Hockey
League. The 2004-05 NHL season was cancelled due to a lockout because the National Hockey
League Players' Association and the team owners could not come to an agreement on salaries.
As a result, the Players' Association and the owners came to an agreement that included the
implementation of a salary cap and revenue sharing. The purpose of this thesis is to determine
whether or not the implementation of the salary cap was beneficial for the National Hockey
League industry and how the labor strike affected revenues. The examination of the
performance of the league's teams and total revenues versus pay will compare and contrast a
few years prior to the lockout to a few years after the lockout. The differences in this data will
demonstrate the effect of the lockout on the performance of the teams and the revenues of
the league.
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Introduction
In 2004 it became apparent that the National Hockey League was going to face
problems in the upcoming months because the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
was going to expire. A dispute between team owners and players, who are represented by the
National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA), began over salaries. The NHLPA is, "a
labour union whose members are the players in the NHL and whose mandate is to represent
their interests. Headquartered in Toronto, the NHLPA has a staff of approximately 35
employees who work in such varied disciplines as labour law, marketing, product licensing,
community relations, and communications" (NHLPA). The owners said that the players were
asking for too much money in salaries and that the teams could not afford to pay the players'
salaries because the league was not making enough in revenues. As a result the 2004-05
season was locked out in an attempt develop a new CBA. A lockout is like a strike, with the
employer stopping its employees from working, to put pressure on the labor union.

During the lockout, countless meetings between the owners and players took place in
order to come to an agreement on what should be a part of the new CBA. The individual
players did not represent themselves at the meetings, but were represented by the NHLPA. On
September 16, 2005 the owners and NHLPA finally came to an agreement, after missing an
entire season of play, and the new Collective Bargaining Agreement was established. It will be
in effect until September 15, 2011. "This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the NHL, the Clubs, NHLPA, and all players, and their respective successors or
assigns" (Collective Bargaining Agreement 2005,11). Part of the CBA also was that the players
agreed not to have a strike, work-stoppage, or a lockout during the length of the agreement.
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Prior to the lockout of 2004-05 there were not many rules in place restricting salary.
The main points of the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement focused on salaries. The CBA
introduced a salary cap, salary minimum, and revenue sharing. Don Campbell, the president of
the Tampa Bay Lightning said, "Getting rich is not the goal [of the CBA]. Every one of these
owners really wants a chance to win" (Brinkman, 2006,11). With the salary cap and revenue
sharing, the goal is to develop parity in the league and give each team an equal chance to
succeed. 1

The salary cap is a maximum salary that a team's total player salaries cannot exceed.
Along with the cap, there is also a salary floor which a team's total player salaries cannot drop
below. All of the salaries are paid in United States dollars even though six teams operate in
Canada. Salary caps were $39 million in 2005-06 (CBA 2005, 217), $44 million in 2006-07, and
$50.3 million in 2007-08. The minimum in 2005-06 was $21.5 million (CBA 2005, 217). The
salary minimum is approximately $16 million less than the maximum or 55% of the maximum.
The cap is adjusted each year because the players are guaranteed a certain percentage of
hockey-related revenues. In 2005-06 it was projected there would be $1.8 billion in revenue
and the players got 54% of that. As revenues rise the players' share can rise. Examples
presented in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2005 are, when revenues are $2.2 billion
they get 55%, $2.4 billion they get 56% and 57% at $2.7 billion. When an individual team is

l Some may wonder why a professional sport was chosen to examine a labor union, but there is a legitimate reason for this.
Labor strikes and lockouts occur in various types of businesses but it is difficult to determine specific variables that are affected
by the work stoppage. "Sports provide the ultimate avenue for examining business and management practices: owing to data
availability, on the one hand, and the high degree of competition in the industry, on the other, sports can serve as a laboratory
enabling the examination of propositions that might take decades or longer in other sectors of the economy" (Frick et. al.,
2003, 472)
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found to be hiding revenue that team is fined $1 million plus the amount the team failed to
report for the first offense. For more offenses the team is fined $5 million plus double the
amount that the team failed to report (CBA 2005,193). To make sure there is an equal revenue
split, part of the players' salaries will be put in escrow. At the end of the season when it is
known what team revenues actually were, the part of the players' salaries that were put into
escrow will be divided among the players and owners (CBA 2005, 140). Since some players had
multiyear contracts before the cap, these contracts were decreased by 24% (CBA 2005, 283).
The 24% decrease was agreed upon by the NHL and the NHLPA during the CBA negotiations.
All players on the team's active roster, injured reserve list, and players who have left the
team on a contract buyout salary are counted against the salary cap. The players who sign a
National Hockey League contract and then are assigned to the minors or junior hockey are not
counted in the cap. If a player is injured and will miss at least ten games the team can have a
replacement player whose salary does not exceed the injured player's salary. An individual
player cannot have a salary that is more than 20% of the cap, and his salary stays the same for
the life of the contract (CBA 2005, 218). If a player signs a multiyear contract the salary will be
averaged out each year regardless if that is what he is actually being paid.
The minimum player salary is $450,000 which will continue to rise to $525,000 in 2011
12, when the Collective Bargaining Agreement expires (CBA 2005, 49). After the 2005 CBA
expires the NHL and NHLPA will have to meet again to develop a new CBA. When a player's age
is between 18 and 21 the individual is required to sign an entry level contract of $850,000 per
year for his first three NHL seasons (CBA 2005, 24). This helps teams who have young talented
players beat the cap because the players can only make a maximum of $850,000 each. If a
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player who is 35 or older signs a multiyear contract his salary is counted against the cap each
year even if he retires before the contract has expired (CBA 2005, 189). Players can still receive
bonuses, which can exceed the cap by 7.5% that season, but the following season the team will
be penalized and whatever funds were spent on bonuses will be deducted from the teams cap.
Only players on entry level contracts, veteran players who have played 400 games or more who
sign a one-year contract after returning from a long-term injury, and players who sign a one
year contract after the age of 35 can be eligible to earn a bonus. No player is allowed to
renegotiate his contract until it expires (CBA 2005, 217).
All of the rule changes presented above have an impact on team's total salaries. With
having the changes, each team will have to adapt the team's salary strategy and be forced to
pay the players what they are worth, not what they are demanding to be paid. This study will
examine the effects that these rule changes have had on the hockey industry in an attempt to
determine if the changes are accomplishing the results that were wanted by the NHL and
NHLPA, a more balanced and fair game. Also, the lockout itself and the new rules may have
impacted the revenues of each team, which will also be examined.
III.

Literature Review
Various studies have been conducted to explain performance and revenues in

professional sports. Some of these studies were conducted before the National Hockey League
lockout of the 2004-2005 season and some were after. The chart below summarizes the
different variables that studies chose to use. Some focus on the individuals, whereas others
focus on the team as a whole and the coaching staff.
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Team
Players
Coach
Revenues,
Age, weight, games played,
Seasons coached in the NHL, career
winning percentage
attendance
goals scored
(Lavoie and Grenier, 1987; Jones and Walsh, 1988; Sommers, 1988; McLean and Veall, 1992;
Gomez, 1992; Idson and Kahane, 1995; Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann, 2003; and Marchand,
Smeeding, and Torrey, 2006)

This section reviews previous studies and background information about pay versus
performance and revenues.
J.C.H. Jones and William D. Walsh (1988), studied how salaries are affected by skills,
structural elements of monopoly, monopsony, and discrimination. This has previously been
done for other professional sports but few studies have focused on the National Hockey
League. All of the data used in this study was from the 1977-78 NHL season. Jones and Walsh's
study looked at independent variables of points per game, games played, penalty minutes,
draft number, height, weight, and a dummy variable for whether or not the player had a French
name. In their study these independent variables are used to explain the dependent variable,
individual player's salaries. The variables change some depending on the position of the player,
since for each position different characteristics are more relevant than others. The findings had
an adjusted R-SQUARED, the goodness of fit of the model, of at least .65. Jones and Walsh had
significant variables at the .1, .05, and .001 levels, but not every variable was statistically
significant which is normal to find. In the study, Jones and Walsh found that skills appear to be
the prime determinant of player salaries, which is shown in various other studies.
Robert C. McLean and Michael R. Veall (1992) expanded on the study by Jones and
Walsh by using player data from the 1989-1990 seasons to determine discrimination:
"Discrimination in labour markets can be salary discrimination or hiring (entry) discrimination.
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One place to study both types is professional sports, where there are publicly-available
statistics which attempt to measure individual performance," (McLean and Walsh 1992, 470).
McLean and Veall specifically studied the discrimination against Francophone Canadians in the
NHL. Their data consisted of Anglophone Canadian, Francophone Canadian, American, and
Europeans for every position in the game. The dependent variable used was life-time points
per game for forwards and defensemen, and for goaltenders, lifetime goals against average.
The objective was to determine performance differentials connected to discrimination, for
which the R-SQUARED was not very high, but higher in comparison to the study conducted by
Lovoie, Grenier, and Voulombe (1978). Lovoie, Grenier, and Voulombe concluded that
Francophone Canadians outperformed Anglophone Canadian players, which they interpreted as
hiring discrimination. A comparison of McLean and Veall's study to Lovoie, Grenier, and
Voulombe's shows similar results. In the 1992 study the coefficients for the Francophone
Canadians and Anglophone Canadian players are smaller and not statistically significant when
compared to the 1978 study, which shows that, as time passes, hiring discrimination against
Francophone's has become less severe.
McLean and Veall's study also tested for salary discrimination based on where the
player is from and what position he plays. Here the dependent variable was the natural log of
salary; McLean and Veall used the same independent variables as before with the addition of
career plus/minus statistics. Plus/minus statistics are the differences between goals scored and
goals scored against, both while the player is on the ice. The results found, just as other studies
have, that higher point production gets a higher salary and the older players generally get
compensated for their years in the league.
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Another study, which was conducted by Todd L. Idson and Leo H. Kahne (1995),
examines pay versus performance but included an aspect that the other studies do not coworker productivity. Idson and Kahne found that, "team attributes have both direct effects
on an individuals' pay, and indirect effects by altering the rates at which individual players'
productive characteristics are valued." This study empirically assesses the effects of the
productivity of teammates on the compensation of individuals on the team, so Idson and Kahne
use independent variables for the individual player, coach, and team. The independent
variables used were
Player
Salary, games played, points per game,
penalty minutes per game, height, weight,
position, draft selection, dummy if the
player was a free agent

Coach
Winning percentage,
number of years coaching in
the National Hockey League

Team
Total
revenues

Idson and Kahne first regressed the player salaries on the players' own productivity and, after
obtaining results, added in the team and coach variables. If the coefficients on their own
productivity fall when the other variables are added, then the effect on the individual player's
salary is determined by the productivity of the player's coworkers, coach and teammate. If the
coefficients fall then the performance of the coaches and teammates affects the individual
player's salary more than his own performance does. Idson and Kahne found that "players
seem to be weakly gross substitutes in the production process in professional hockey and that
labor inputs tend to be complementary factors" (Idson and Kahne, 1995). This means that the
other players on the team and the coaching staff have a large effect on how an individual
performs.
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Bernd Frick, Joachim Prinz, and Karina Winkelmann (2003) discuss pay inequalities and
team performance in the National Basketball Association, National Football League, Major
League Baseball, and National Hockey League. The studies discussed on the previous pages
look at wage differentials over time and try to explain the wage gap's effect on performance,
but few attempts have been made to analyze the influence of pay inequality on economic
outcomes. Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann compare their data with Gomez (2002) who found
that "social capital is harmed in an organization that treats its labor inputs simply as a variable
cost of production in need of minimization rather than a fixed cost of production." Gomez used
data from five seasons, 1993-1998. Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann's study used data from
sixteen consecutive seasons beginning in 1988. Winning percentage is the dependent variable
and independent variables are wage disparity, number of players on the roster, team dummies,
and year dummies. The study found that in hockey a team is more successful as the pay
distribution becomes more unequal over those sixteen seasons, "This implies that a single 'starplayer' may be of paramount importance for the team's performance - which, in turn will lead
to a highly skewed distribution of player salaries without negatively affecting the performance
of those at the lower end of the pay hierarchy" (Frick et. al., 2003).
Brinkman (2006) presents some of the effects of the 2005 Collective Bargaining
Agreement of the salary cap and revenue sharing. As a result of the salary cap the star players
are spread amongst the league and are not being paid as much as before the cap. This changes
the results that Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann found because teams cannot afford to pay their
star player a huge salary and cannot afford to have multiple start players on their roster. The
players will have to agree to take a salary cut.
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The study by P.M. Sommers (1998) of salary distribution and performance found that
inequality has a negative impact on performance. He looked at the effect of salary inequality
on NHL team performance by using different inequality measures and end-of-season team
outcomes such as team points and the probability of a team making the playoffs. Joseph T.
Marchand, Timothy M. Smeeding, and Barbara Boyle Torrey (2006) also studied this and used
two approaches to measuring salary distribution and performance. The first way was the same
that Sommers (1998) used and the second was focusing on the distribution of individual
performance and of teamwork among linemen on a given team. Marchand, Smeeding, and
Torrey found that inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution was more important to
positive outcomes than was inequality in the lower half of the salary distribution.
As a result of the lockout, new rules were introduced by the 2005 Collective Bargaining
Agreement which directly affected player salaries, the salary cap, and team revenues, revenue
sharing. Taylor F. Brinkman (2006, 2) discusses revenue sharing, "In combination with a hard
payroll cap, the plan [revenue sharing] promises to help restore parity in the league by
redistributing a minimum of 4.5 percent of league revenues from the top ten revenue
producing clubs to the bottom ten revenue producing clubs. Architects of the deal claim that
the redistribution should allow low-revenue teams like Nashville and Carolina to be more
financially competitive in free agency, which should presumably help them to be more
competitive on the ice." Brinkman used data from the 1994-2004 seasons to study payroll
versus points. The points are determined by wins and ties for the regular season games. For
each of these seasons the regression output he obtained was not very good which he measured
by the R-SQUARED value for each season, which demonstrates how much the independent
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variables explain the variation of the dependent variable. This means that since payroll does
not fully explain how a team performs, there must be other variables which explain this.
Brinkman says that this could be due to the fact that just because a team has the highest paid
players, it does not mean that these players have good chemistry on the ice and will perform
well together. Team owners have to make the decision either to focus on maximizing their
revenues or to maximize the team's wins. The choice that owners make before the lockout
may be different from after the lockout as a result of revenue sharing. The goals of the 2005
Collective Bargaining Agreement are to increase the competitive balance of the league - which
for this paper is defined as the fans perceived probability that their team will reach the playoffs
at the beginning of the season (Ross, 2002). Brinkman concluded that if "parity does not
increase, it will likely be due to the payroll compression at the top of the league due to the
salary cap, not additional spending by teams at the bottom due to revenue sharing" (Brinkman
2006).
All of the studies have come to similar conclusions. The studies consistently found that
skills appear to be the prime determination of player salaries, higher point production gets a
higher salary, older players generally get compensated for their years in the league, and
inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution is more important to positive outcomes
than inequality was in the lower half of the salary distribution. These were all findings from
before the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which introduced the salary cap and revenue
sharing. Brinkman (2006) discusses how the newly introduced NHL salary cap and NHL revenue
sharing could limit the findings that inequality in salaries is better for team performance,
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because now the goals of the league are to limit this and bring parity to the National Hockey
League.

From all of the studies discussed above, the following theoretical model was developed
taking into consideration all of the variables each of the previous studies used. This is to
determine the effect of the lockout on the performance of the teams and the revenues of the
league.

III.

Theoretical Model

To compare the pre-lockout points and revenues to the post-lockout points and
revenues two separate regressions are necessary. The first uses POINTS as the dependent
variable and the second uses REVENUES as the dependent variable. Each has a different set of
independent variables that will explain POINTS and REVENUES; however some variables are
included in both regressions. The two regressions were utilized. Each consisted of one
hundred eighty observations, which include three seasons before the lockout and three seasons
after the lockout. In order to differentiate the impacts from pre-lockout to post-lockout, a
slope dummy variable was used for each independent variable. Also, an intercept dummy was
included in each regression to show the effects of pre-lockout times. These slope dummies
measure the effects of each variable just using the three years before the lockout. When
combining the slope dummies with each variable the effects of the pre-lockout are shown. For
the post-lockout only each variable is considered because the intercept and slope dummies do
not apply. These outputs are then compared to each other to show the effects of the 2004
2005 National Hockey League Lockout and the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement which
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introduced the salary cap and revenue sharing. For this econometrics study, various data had
to be collected or computed. The majority of the statistics and data were collected from
NHL.com. The salaries were collected from the USA Today Salary Database.

Table 1: Explanation of Variables fo r the Points regression
POINTS:

Points are the dependent variable. POINTS is
measured by a combination of wins (2 points), ties (1
point), overtime losses (1 point), and shootout losses
(1 point)

ATTENDANCE:

The teams' total attendance for all 41 home games
during the regular season. It does not include playoff
games.

AVGAGE:

The teams' average age of all of the players that were
on the roster in the season.

AVGAGESQ:

The team's average age squared of all of the players
that were on the roster in the season.

PENALTYKILL:

The percentage of times when the team was on the
penalty kill and it did not give up a goal.

POWERPLAY:

The percentage of times when the team was on the
power play and scored a goal.

RELSALRY:

The relative salary for each team. This is found by first
finding the league average salary by dividing the total
league salary by the number of teams in the league,
30. Then by dividing the individual team salary by the
league average salary.

SHOTS:

The average number of shots a team took during the
82 regular season games.

SHOTSAGAINST:

The average number of shots a team gave up during
the 82 regular season games.

STANLEYCUP:

The number of Stanley Cups, league championship,
which the team has won in the season the data is from
14

and the previous 4 seasons.
TOPPAID:

The number of the twenty-five top paid players in the
league that the team has on the teams' rosters.

LNYEARS:

The natural log of the number of years that the team
has been in the city they currently play in

PRECAP:

The intercept dummy variable that is used to
determine whether the data is from the three years
before the 2004-05 NHL Lockout.

PCATT, PCAVGAGE,
PCAVGAGESQ,
PCPENALTYKILL,
PCPOWERPLAY,
PCRELSALARY,
PCSHOTS,
PCSHOTSAGAINST,
PCSTANLEYCUP,
PCTOPPAID,
PCLNYEARS:

These are the slope dummies that are used to
demonstrate the effects of each independent variable
on the dependent variable. It is found by multiplying
the PRECAP intercept dummy by each of the
independent variables. For example: PCATT =
PRECAP*ATTENDANCE

In the first regression POINTS is the dependent variable. It is used to measure how well
a team performs during the season. A dilemma presented itself on whether or not to use
POINTS or winning percentage. After review of previous studies, it was decided to use points.
Brinkman states, "Professional ice hockey is peculiar among team sports in that the teams are
not ranked simply based on winning percentage. Rather, teams are ranked based on a point
system that awards two points to the winner of a contest, and one point to each team if the
contest ends in a tie. Since ties affect teams' relative on-ice success, but are not reflected in
teams' winning percentage, we chose to use points, not winning percentage, as the dependent
or outcome variable" (2006, 5). This study selected the following independent variables
because after research they were determined to be the best factors that influence points.
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ATTENDANCE is used as an independent variable due to its effect on team performance.
It demonstrates the number of buyers that are attending games. If there are more people in
attendance cheering the team on, the team most likely will attempt to perform better. This is a
reason that teams really enjoy playing games at home because a lot of fans are in the stands
wanting them to win. This creates a positive energy in the stadium and makes the game more
enjoyable for the fans and players. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on points
because the more people attending a game the better a team will perform.
AVGAGE is chosen because knowledge and experience can affect team performance.
Teams that have a higher average age tend to perform better because their players have been
in the league longer and they know things about the game that younger players might not
know. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with points because the higher
the teams age is the better the team will perform; however, this positive performance will
begin to decline at some point. Because of this AVGAGESQ. is also used in the regression. This
allows the model to represent diminishing marginal skills.
PENALTYKILL is another variable that was chosen. Players would rather not receive
penalties; however this does occur quite often. As a result, the teams that are then on the
penalty kill play with at least one less player than the other team. This puts the offending team
at a disadvantage and consequently, increases the probability of more goals being scored by
the opposition. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with points. If a team
does not allow the other team to score at this part in the game, then the team on the penalty
kill is not giving up a goal at one of the easiest times of the game for the other team to score.
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This study uses POWERPLAY as an independent variable. Players enjoy playing on the
power play because they have at least one more player on the ice than the other team as a
result of a penalty. It is easier for them to score at this time, and if a team is scoring then they
are one step closer to winning the game which is the players' objective. This variable is
expected to have a positive relationship with points because if a team is scoring during the
power play they are closer to earning points for that game.
RELSALARY reflects producer expectations for team performance. In this case the
producers are the team owners. If the owners are paying their players high salaries they are
doing this because they have performed well in the past and are also expected to perform well
in the future. So these players should be having success with their teams. This variable is
expected to have a positive effect on points because, if a team is paying their players more
money, they should be performing better. These data came from the USA Today salary
database. The USA Today Salaries contains seasonal listings of salaries for NHL players for each
of the six seasons. "The advantage of this salary database is that it contains guidelines for
reporting salaries, which are consistent across seasons. The data contain players who had
played at least 30 games in a season or who appeared in fewer than 30 games due to injury"
(Marchand et. al., 2006, 5)

SHOTS was chosen as an independent variable. The athletes want to win and in order to
do so they take shots in order to score a goal. When a team is taking a lot of shots, the fans get
excited and will be supportive. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on points
because if a team is making more shots during a game they should be scoring more goals which
will be producing more points.
17

SHOTSAGAINST is selected because it could affect both the players and fans. One would
think that the athletes would perform better if the number of shots that they gave up was
fewer. The more shots a team gives up, the worse the team is playing. So the players want to
give up as few shots as possible because they want to win. The fans' tastes and preferences are
also to see fewer shots against the team because they want their teams to win and if they give
up fewer shots, the fans will be more supportive. This variable is expected to have a negative
effect on points because if a team is giving up a greater number of shots, the team is going to
earn a fewer number of points.
STANLEYCUP is used because of producer expectations and changes in consumer
expectations. Before the salary cap, once a team won a championship, the team's successful
players often changed teams because those players then believe they are worth more money
and seek a higher salary. However, after the salary cap, this does not occur as often because
other teams cannot offer the higher salaries. Before the salary cap this variable is expected to
have a negative effect on the points since the teams do not have enough money to retain the
successful players. After the cap this variable is expected to have a positive effect on the points
since the teams could retain their successful players without other teams offering them a larger
salary.
TOPPAID is chosen because of producer expectations' impact on supply. If the
producer, owner of the team, expects that a player will perform well and is worth a high salary
that owner will try to get them on their team. The owner's expectations should create a
greater supply of top paid players on the team. This variable is expected to have a positive
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effect on points because the more top paid players a team has the better one would expect
them to perform.
LNYEARS is used because knowledge and experience can impact demand. The more
years a team has been located in a city, the more knowledge they will have with running a
professional hockey team. This could benefit the team in terms of making revenue. Also, if
they have been in a city longer, one would expect them to have an established fan base that
continuously support the team. This is expected to have a positive effect on points. The
natural log of years was used instead of years because it represents that the more years a team
has been in a city the more they will make in revenues until a certain point and then it will level
off.
PRECAP was included because it is an intercept dummy variable. It has a value of 1 if
the observation is from 2001-02, 2002-03, or 2003-04 season. It has a value of 0 if the
observation is from 2005-06, 2006-07, or 2007-08 season. If PRECAP is statistically significant,
the coefficient of the variable will be added to the intercept coefficient when evaluating the
results for the precap times.
The slope dummies are used to show the differences in each variable from precap times
to postcap times. This is demonstrated by,
Yt =

β0 + β 1 X1t + β 2D + β 3DXt

If D=1 precap then the relationship will be
Yt =

(β 0+ β2) + (β1 + β3) Xt
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This graph will look like this if both the independent variable and slope dummy are both
significant and positive. The precap will have a steeper slope than the post cap.

I will be evaluating each variable I have chosen and their related slope dummy variables
to see if this type of relationship exists which will demonstrate the changes in each variable
from precap times to postcap times.

Table 2: Explanation of Variables fo r the Revenues regression
REVENUES:

Revenues are the dependent variable. It is measured in
millions of dollars and the total revenues for each
organization for a year.

ATTENDANCE:

The teams' total attendance for all 41 home games
during the regular season. It does not include playoff
games.

AVGTICPRICE:

The average ticket price for each team. It does not
include the premium seating.

CANADIAN:

A dummy variable for whether or not the team is
Canadian.

PROSPORTS:

The number of professional sports that are also played
in the same city as the NHL team. They consist of the
National Basketball League, National Football League,
Canadian Football League, and Major League Baseball.
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TOPPAID:

The number of the twenty-five top paid players in the
league that the team has on their roster.

YEARS:

The number of years that the team has been in the city
they currently play in.

POINTS:

The number of points the team accumulates during the
82 game regular season. They receive 2 points for a win,
1 point for a tie, overtime loss, or shootout loss.

GOALFOR:

The total number of goals scored by the team in the 82
game regular season.

PRECAP

The intercept dummy variable that is used to determine
whether the data is from the three years before the
2004-05 NHL Lockout.

PCATT,
PCAVGTICPRICE,
PCCANADIAN,
PCPROSPORTS,
PCTOPPAID,
PCYEARS,
PCPOITNS,
PCGOALFOR:

These are the slope dummies that are used to
demonstrate the effects of each independent variable
on the dependent variable. It is found by multiplying
the PRECAP intercept dummy by each of the
independent variables.
For example: PCATT = PRECAP*ATTENDANCE

For this particular regression, REVENUES, is the dependent variable, which is measured
in millions of dollars. The goal is to determine whether or not the revenue sharing that was
implemented to the National Hockey League in 2005 had much affect on how much teams were
making. By implementing revenue sharing, the clubs are forced to cooperate, evening out the
distribution of talent for the good of the league. To make the game more exciting for fans,
there must be parity in the league, and teams should have equal changes to be successful. The
following independent variables were selected because after research they were determined to
be the best factors that influence revenues. The NHL gets revenue from ticket sales, television
contracts, and merchandise sales. All of this is based on the fan interest. It is believed that the
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demand for hockey is elastic because there is a small base of diehard fans but the majority of
people that attend games are not diehard fans.

ATTENDANCE is used because it affects demand since it shows the number of buyers
that a team has during the regular season. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on
the dependent variable, revenues, because as the attendance at the games increases the
revenues that will be made will increase.
AVGTICPRICE is selected because of producer expectations and consumer expectations
influence on supply and demand. The owners will set ticket prices based on charging a certain
amount and still making revenues. They want to set this price above where their marginal costs
will equal the average total costs so that they are making profits. Hockey teams are able to
increase their ticket prices because their customers have the highest average household
income, $88,000 in sports (Ozanian, Badenhausen, 2008). Because of hockey fans income,
changes in ticket prices do not deter many of the fans from attending games. The consumers'
expectations will influence whether or not they actually want to purchase the tickets at these
prices that are set. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with revenues
because as the average ticket price increases, as long as they are still selling tickets, the
revenues will increase.

CANADIAN was decided on because it demonstrates tastes and preferences which is a
determinant of demand. Hockey is an extremely popular sport in Canada so one would expect
that the Canadian people will spend more money supporting their national support. Thus, this
variable should have a positive effect on revenues.

22

PROSPORTS is used because it shows both substitutes and complements which affect
demand. The other professional sports in the city can be a substitute for the National Hockey
League fans, but can also be a complement. A lot of fans support a city, not just a particular
team and will buy merchandise and attend games in each sport. Also, a lot of cities' sports
teams will work together for support of the teams and provide promotions for various teams in
the city. Some promotions allow fans to take their ticket stub from one sports game to the
ticket booth where they can purchase a ticket to another sport for a discounted price. During
the lockout, there were no NHL games to attend, so the hockey fans turned to the other sports
in the city as a substitute. This could have affected NHL teams because people may have
realized that they enjoy the other sports more. Also during the lockout a lot of teams gave
discounted tickets to other sports in the cities to their season ticket holders and frequent ticket
buyers to keep them interested. This could have hurt the fan base for the NHL and after the
lockout the people who used to support the NHL teams have turned to other professional
sports. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on the revenues, however it is
expected that before the cap it will have a larger impact.
TOPPAID is selected because it demonstrates the changes in expectations of the
consumers which will affect the demand. If a team has more of the higher paid players in the
league their revenues could increase because the fans will expect the team to perform better
and want to support teams that perform well. A number of these top paid players have a fan
base just for them, so these fans will attend the games just to watch that particular player and
purchase merchandise to support that player. This variable will have a positive effect on the
revenues.
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YEARS is chosen because of consumer expectations impacts on demand. If a team has
been in a city for awhile they have established a fan base and these fans expect certain things.
They will have more knowledge of the team since they have been around longer. This variable
is expected to have a positive effect on revenues because the more years a team has been in a
city the greater fan base they will have to support their team an increase revenues.
POINTS is used because of changes in consumer expectations. If a team is performing
well then people will be more willing to support that team. This occurs a lot later in the season
when certain teams are not performing very well so they join other teams that are performing
better. As consumers expectations change, how they support their teams will change. This
variable is expected to have a positive effect on revenues because as a team performs better
more people will support the team monetarily.
GOALFOR is utilized because it demonstrates how tastes and preferences and changes in
expectations can affect demand. The expectations of the fans of how many goals a team will
score will affect the revenues because they will determine if they want to support the team for
a particular game based on how many goals they think the team will score against different
opponents. The number of goals scored also applies to peoples tastes and preferences because
some people want to see an exciting game with a lot of scoring while other want to see a game
with excellent defense and goaltending with a low scoring game. This variable is hypothesized
to have a negative effect on revenues. Because of the fans tastes and preferences the variable
of goals scored separates the hockey fans from the individuals that go to the games for purely
entertainment purposes. After asking various hockey fans, they said they enjoy games that are
low scoring with great goaltending. They find that to be more exciting because they
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understand the game. People who are there just for entertainment purposes want to see a lot
of goals because they feel that is the exciting part of the game. The number of fans should
outnumber the number of people who are there for entertainment purposes which is why this
variable is negatively related to revenues.
The intercept dummy, PRECAP, and all of the slope dummies are used once again for the
same reasons they were used in the regression where POINTS was the dependent variable.

IV.

Presentation and Analysis of Data
Estimated Equations:

PRECAP REVENUES =(β 0 + β17) PRECAP + (β 1 + β 2) ATTENDANCE + (β 3+ β 4)
AVGTICPRICE + (β 5 + β 6) CANADIAN + (β 7+β8) GOALFOR +(β 9+ β 10) POINTS + (β 11
+ β 12 ) PROSPORTS + (β13 + β 12 ) TOPPAID +(β 15+ β 16) YEARS

POSTCAP REVENUES =β 0 + β 1 ATTENDANCE + β 3AVGTICPRICE + β 5 CANADIAN +
β 7 GOALFOR + β 9 POINTS + β 11 PROSPORTS + β 13TOPPAID +β15 YEARS

PRECAP POINTS = (β 0 + β 23) PRECAP + ( β 1 + β 2) ATTENDANCE + (β 3 + β 4) AVGAGE
+ (β 5 + β 6) AVGAGESQ +(β 7+ β 8) PENALTYKILL + (β 9+ β 10) POWERPLAY + (β 11 +
β 12) RELSALARY + (β 13+ β 14) TOPPAID+ (β 15 +β 6) LNYEARS+ (β 17+ β18)
STANLEYCUP+ (β19 + β 20) SHOTS + (β 2 1 + P 22) SHOTSAGAINST
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POSTCAP POINTS = (β0 + β1 ATTENDANCE + β3 AVGAGE + β5 AVGAGESQ + β7
PENALTYKILL + β9 POWERPLAY + β11 RELSALARY+ β13 TOPPAID + β15 LNYEARS +

β17 STANLEYCUP+ β19 SHOTS+ β21 SHOTSAGAINST

a.

Presentation and Analysis of Data - Revenues
Dependent Variable: REVENUES
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/04/10 Time: 12:19
Sample: 1 180
Included observations: 180
Variable
Coefficient
C
15.65633
ATTENDANCE
-7.79E-05
PCATT
0.000165
AVGTICPRICE
-0.387480
PCAVGTICPRICE
0.751739
CANADIAN
14.58938
PCCANADIAN
-20.32354
GOALFOR
-3.526132
PCGOALFOR
3.490605
POINTS
0.934279
PCPOINTS
-0.721331
PROSPORTS
0.039291
PCPROSPORTS
3.451816
TOPPAID
-0.066862
PCTOPPAID
2.553069
6.528476
YEARS
PCYEARS
-6.319773
PRECAP
-44.64152
R-squared
0.754674
Adjusted R-squared
0.728930
S.E. of regression
14.87959
35867.14
Sum squared resid
-731.9247
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
2.122721

t-Statistic
Std. Error
0.768222
20.37995
2.72E-05 -2.861744
4.530891
3.64E-05
0.208882 -1.855019
0.315918
2.379536
5.608973
2.601078
7.826341 -2.596812
2.318733 -1.520715
1.504047
2.320808
6.676780
0.139930
0.212664 -3.391882
0.083457
0.470799
2.198218
1.570279
0.148944 -0.448903
1.835083
1.391255
4.150444
1.572959
1.575015 -4.012517
28.54575 -1.563859
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.
0.4435
0.0048
0.0000

0.0654
0.0185
0.0102
0.0103
0.1303
0.1345
0.0000

0.0009
0.6384
0.0294
0.6541
0.1661
0.0001
0.0001
0.1198
53.97778
28.57920
8.332497
8.651793
29.31445
0.000000

By evaluating the regression output where total team revenues are the dependent
variable the overall goodness of fit, R-SQUARED, is fairly good. The adjusted R-SQUARED is
.728930. The significant variables are ATTENDANCE, PCATT, AVGTICPRICE, PCAVGTICPRICE,
CANADIAN, PCCANADIAN, POINTS, PCPOINTS, PCPROSPORTS, YEARS, and PCYEARS. The
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variable of ATTENDANCE is only statistically significant before the lockout, because after the
lockout the sign is not as hypothesized. From this regression output two separate equations
can be formed, one for precap revenues, and the other for postcap revenues.

PRECAP Revenues:
Revenues = 15.66C + .00086Attendance + .365AvgTicPrice - 5.73Canadian +
.214Points + 3.45ProSports + .209Years

POSTCAP Revenues:
Revenues = 15.66C - .387AvgTicPrice + 14.589Canadian + .934Points + 6.53Years
The values of the coefficients for the precap revenues are found by combining the
coefficients of the independent variable and the related slope dummy variable. The attendance
coefficient was found by combining -.0000779 and .000165, which results in .00086. This was
done for every statistically significant variable where the slope dummy was also statistically
significant. These variables are ATTENDANCE, AVGTICPRICE, CANADIAN, POINTS, and YEARS.
The variable of PROSPORTS was not significant, but the slope dummy, PCPROSSPORTS was, so
the coefficient value of 3.45 was included in the precap equation. Also notice that the intercept
is 15.66 for both the precap and postcap equations. This is due to the fact that the PRECAP
intercept dummy variable was not statistically significant.
The values of the coefficients for the postcap revenues are found directly from the
regression output. Each independent variable that was statistically significant is included in the
equation. These variables were AVGTICPRICE, CANADIAN, POINTS, and YEARS. The PROSPORTS
variable is not statistically significant in the postcap times. Once again, ATTENDANCE is not
statistically significant because the sign is not as hypothesized.
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Each of the statistically significant variables has changed from precap to postcap times.
The impacts that each will have on total team revenues will be different, which is shown by the
corresponding coefficients. This can be evaluated by comparing the precap revenues to
postcap revenues equation. Before the lockout for every fan that attended a game, revenues
would increase by .00086 million dollars, other variables held constant. After the lockout, no
results can be drawn from the ATTENDANCE variable since it was not statistically significant
which could be because other variables are influencing revenues more after the lockout. .
However; NHL arenas fill to 93% of capacity in 2007-08 season, so attendance is not a large
problem (Ozanian et. al., 2008). For every dollar increase in average ticket prices before the
lockout, revenues increased by $365,000. After the lockout for every dollar increase in average
ticket prices, revenues decreased by $387,000. Before the lockout, if a team was located in
Canada they were making 5.73 million dollars less than a team that was located in America.
After the lockout, the Canadian teams were making 14.589 million dollars more than teams
located in America. This could be because hockey is extremely popular in Canada, but Canadian
fans were not supporting their teams much before the lockout, however; these fans could have
missed having the NHL for an entire season and once the NHL came back they supported their
teams a lot more. Before and after the lockout, the amount of points a team earns in a season
had a positive effect on revenues. However, it became greater after the lockout. For every
additional point a team earned before the cap, the team was making $214,000, and after the
cap teams were making $934,000 for each increase in points, other variables held constant.
This could be directly related to the parity that was hoped to be created by the 2005 Collective
Bargaining Agreement. If teams have a more equal chance of being successful the fans will
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want to support them more in hopes of their team being the best. Also, the teams who have
more points are the more successful teams in the league so their fans will want to support a
winning team. For every year a team has been in the league they will make $209,000 before
the lockout and $653,000 after the lockout. This is because teams that have been in a city
longer will have an established fan base that will support the team.
The PROSPORTS variable is only impacting revenues before the lockout, and has no
impact after the lockout since the PROSPORTS variable is not statistically significant. Since
PCPROSPORTS is statistically significant it makes a difference during precap times. For every
addition professional sports team located in the city the revenues of the NHL team will increase
by 3.45 million dollars. This is because a lot of teams in the city will work together for fans and
revenues. The teams will advertise and promote together, so there is more advertising if there
are more teams in a city. Also, a lot of fans are fans of all of the teams in the same city, so they
act as complements for one another. During the lockout a lot of promotions were offered by
hockey teams to support the other professional teams in the city. This included discounted
tickets to season-ticket holders and long time supporters of the NHL teams so they would still
have entertainment from professional sports. Some of these people realized that going to a
Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Football League, or Canadian
Football League games was better for them than attending NHL games. This may be a reason
that PROSPORTS variable does not have an impact on revenues after the lockout.
Another interesting thing that these regressions show is the mean revenues before and
after the lockout. This can be seen in the descriptive statistics which are located in the
appendix, A-3 and A-4. Before the lockout the average revenues for a team was $71,210,000
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and after the lockout was $82,780,000. So after the lockout teams were better in terms of
revenue generated, which could be attribute to the revenue sharing policy that was developed
in the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Multicollinearity and serial correlation are some problems that can occur with this type
of study, however; I did not find evidence of these problems existing.

b.

Presentation and Analysis of Data - Points
Dependent Variable: POINTS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/15/10 Time: 12:20
Sample: 1 180
Included observations: 180
Coefficient
Variable
C
1717.179
ATTENDANCE
1.04E-05
PCATT
1.76E-05
AVGAGE
-134.6528
PCAVGAGE
140.9159
2.508735
AVGAGESQ
-2.603715
PCAVGAGESQ
PENALTYKILL
1.632513
PCPENALTYKILL
0.203746
POWERPLAY
2.450081
-0.567172
PCPOWERPLAY
RELSALARY
15.50920
-22.13897
PCRELSALARY
TOPPAID
0.191413
PCTOPPAID
1.488185
-1.637048
LNYEARS
1.815320
PCLNYEARS
STANLEYCUP
-0.273950
-2.659381
PCSTANLEYCUP
SHOTS
0.309806
1.527621
PCSHOTS
SHOTSAGAINST
-0.864719
PCSHOTSAGAINST -0.868465
PRECAP
-1931.151
0.596154
R-squared
0.536612
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
10.17570
16153.00
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
-660.1303
Durbin-Watson stat
2.191444

Std. Error
t-Statistic
745.1171
2.304576
0.701065
1.49E-05
0.822137
2.14E-05
54.88134 -2.453525
64.94411
2.169803
1.015572
2.470269
1.200241 -2.169327
3.330071
0.490234
0.264897
0.769152
0.508711
4.816256
0.699029 -0.811372
9.106384
1.703113
12.65601 -1.749285
0.109011
1.755901
0.542322
2.744101
1.521549 -1.075909
0.806437
2.251038
3.777011 -0.072531
4.917850 -0.540761
0.646952
0.478870
1.100561
1.388038
0.575830 -1.501691
0.801014 -1.084207
892.5224 -2.163700
Mean dependent var
S.D.dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
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Prob.
0.0225
0.4843
0.4123
0.0152
0.0315
0.0146
0.0316
0.0011
0.7914
0.0000
0.4184
0.0905
0.0822
0.9133
0.5884
0.2836
0.4212
0.9423
0.5894
0.6327
0.1671
0.1352
0.2799
0.0320
88.97778
14.94831
7.601448
8.027176
10.01242
0.000000

By evaluating the regression output where points are the dependent variable the overall
goodness of fit, R-SQUARED, is fairly good. The adjusted R-SQUARED is .536612. The significant
variables are AVGAGE, PCAVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, PCAVGAGESQ, PENALTYKILL, PCPENALTYKILL,
POWERPLAY, PCPOWERPLAY, RELSALARY, PCRELSALARY, and PRECAP. From this regression
output two separate equations can be formed, one for precap points, and the other for postcap
points.

PRECAP Points:
Points = -213.971C + 6.26AvgAge - .09AvgAgeSq - 6.63RelSalary

POSTCAP Points:
Points = 1717.179C - 134.65AvgAge + 2.15AvgAgeSq + 1.63PenaltyKill
+2.45PowerPlay + 15.51RelSalary
The values of the coefficients for the precap points are found by combining the
coefficients of the independent variable and the related slope dummy variable. The RELSALARY
coefficient was found by combining 15.51 and -22.14, which results in -6.63. This was done for
every statistically significant variable where the slope dummy was also statistically significant.
These variables are AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, RELSALARY, and PRECAP. PRECAP is the intercept
dummy, so it was combined with the coefficient of C, which changes the intercept from precap
to postcap. The variables of PENALTYKILL and POWERPLAY were only statistically significant
after the lockout, which is why both are only included in the postcap equation.
The values of the coefficients for the postcap revenues are found directly from the
regression output. Each independent variable that was statistically significant is included in the
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equation. These variables were AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, PENALTYKILL, POWERPLAY, and
RELSALRY.
Each of the statistically significant variables has changed from precap to postcap times.
The impacts that each will have on total team revenues will be different, which is shown by the
corresponding coefficients. This can be evaluated by comparing the precap revenues to
postcap revenues equation. Before the salary cap AVGAGE had a positive effect on POINTS,
and after the salary cap it had a negative effect on POINTS. This means that he older a team is ’
before the lockout the better they performed to a certain point, but after the lockout if a team
was older, they performed worse. Before the lockout for every million dollars in salary relative
to the rest of the league that a team spent on salaries the total points earned by the team
decreased by 6.63. After the lockout for every million dollars in salary relative to the rest of the
league that a team spent on salaries the total points earned by the team increases by 15.51. So
before the salary cap was introduced teams were paying their players more and performing
worse. After the salary cap, owners had to carefully consider and evaluate how much to pay
each player and the teams performed better since RELSALARY is positively related to points
after the salary cap.
After the salary cap PENALTYKILL and POWERPLAY independent variables are
statistically significant, and they were not before the cap. For every percentage better a team
was on the PENALTYKILL the team received 1.63 more points in the standings. For every
percentage better a team was on the POWEPLAY the team received 2.45 more points in the
standings. This demonstrates that POWERPLAY and PENALTYKILL is more important to how
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well a team performs overall after the salary cap when the talent in the league is more spread
out.
All other variables that were included in the regression assume the coefficient of zero
because they are not statistically significant. Therefore they have no effect on the results and
there is no need for those variables to be discussed.
Multicollinearity and serial correlation are some problems that can occur with this type
of study, however; I did not find evidence of these problems existing.

V.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
This econometrics study analyzes two different aspects of a professional sport,

performance as measured by POINTS and earnings measured by REVENUES. This study is
different from many other previous studies that have been done because this analyzes the
team as a whole whereas other studies analyze individual players. The goal of this study was to
determine the independent variables that best explain performance and revenues and analyze
how they changed due to a labor dispute.
The R-SQUARED of revenues was .75467. The R-SQUARED represents that 75.467% of
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. The RSQUARED of points was .59615. The R-SQUARED represents that 59.615% of the variation in
the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. Since all of these regressions
do not have a R-SQUARED of 1.0 there are more variables that can be included or taken out;
however, having a model that is perfect is extremely rare.
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After comparing the regression outputs for revenues as the dependent variable before
and after the 2004-05 National Hockey League lockout, a few conclusions can be drawn. Before
the lockout teams were making less money in revenues overall compared to after the lockout.
This is demonstrating that fans enjoy the "New NHL" that was created by the 2005 Collective
Bargaining Agreement and the revenue sharing is helping. The promotions and other
professional sports in the same cities used to be more of a complement with each other,
however; after not having the NHL season for a year other professional sports have become
more of a substitute for professional hockey.
Fewer conclusions can be drawn from the regression output where points are the
dependent variable. A lot of the variables were not significant, if they had been a lot of
conclusions could have been shown. One conclusion that these results do show is that there
are lagged effects. The changes in the competitive balance of the league are going to take
more time than just the three years after the salary cap was introduced. If this study were
done later with more years of data included, it may show that the goal of the 2005 Collective
Bargaining Agreement to alter the competitive balance of the National Hockey League was met.
Another conclusion that was drawn from the POINTS regression was after the lockout
when the salary cap was introduced team owners did not have the ability to pay players what
they wanted, but had to pay them what they were worth based on past and expected
performance. When teams could spend as much as they wanted they would try to get the best
players in the league and end up having a price war with other owners who wanted the same
players. This drastically raised the salaries of certain players. This resulted in certain teams
having a couple of highly paid players and then a large number of low paid players on the
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roster. After the salary cap came into effect teams had to alter their rosters, releasing high paid
players, and then acquires more average paid players. These players ended up playing better
together and performing better as a whole. Hockey is a team sport and one player cannot
control the outcome of the game on their own. Since hockey is a team sport every player on
the game roster will play in the game with exception of the backup goalie.

If one evaluates the descriptive statistics in the appendix, A-1 and A-2, the mean
number of points each team earned increased, so overall the teams are performing better.
However, the increase in the mean could be because there is a winner in every game now.
Before the lock-out games could end in a tie, resulting in each team earning one point in the
standings. After the lock-out, every game ends with a winner and loser, the winner receiving
two points. Also, the standard deviation decreased from 15.15 to 14.47, which could indicate
that disparity in POINTS was reduced as a result of the salary cap.

The descriptive statistics for revenues, A-3 and A-4, are also very interesting. All
descriptive statistics for REVENUES increased including of skewness, which could be because
the maximum team revenue was so high and could be an outlier. The descriptive statistics for
GOALFOR shows that one of the objectives of the Collective Bargaining Agreement was met,
the increase in goals scored in a game. The mean, median, maximum, and minimum all
increased greatly.

For each regression there are independent variables that can be controlled and some
that cannot be controlled. For the variables that can be controlled, some are controlled by the
team owners while others are controlled by the players. In the regression where POINTS is the
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dependent variable, the only variable that cannot be controlled is LNYEARS. The variables that
are controlled by the owners are ATTENDANCE, AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, RELSALARY, and
TOPPAID. They control these because they choose the players to be on the team and how
much to pay them. The variables that are controlled by the players are POWERPLAY,
PENALTYKILL, STANLEYCUP, SHOTS, and SHOTSAGAINST. They control these because they are
determined by how well the players play. The variable of RELSALARY that the owners control
has the most effect on POINTS in the post-lockout regression. The higher the team salary
relative to the total league salary, the more points a team will earn in the standings. Before the
lockout this variable was not even significant. Because of this, the owners who control
RELSALRY should pay close attention to what players they choose for their team and how much
to pay them because that impact how well the team performs in the standings. As stated
earlier, owners want to win. The variable POWERPLAY that the players control has the most
effect on POINTS in the post-lockout regression. As a result of this, the players should work
even harder to score more goals while on the power play because this model demonstrates
that it will increase their points in the standings more than any of the other variables they
control.

In the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable, the variables that cannot
be controlled are PROSPORTS, CANADIAN, and YEARS. The variables that are controlled by the
owners are ATTENDANCE, AVGTICPRICE, and TOPPAID. This is because the owners choose the
players on the team and set their ticket prices which will affect the attendance at games. The
players can control POINTS and GOALFOR because these are measured by their performance in
games. The variable AVGTICPRICE which the owners control impact REVENUES the most. The
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variable POINTS is controlled by the players and has the most effect on revenues that they can
control. Because of this, the players should try to gain as many points in the standings as
possible to increase their team revenues. If they do this they could be paid more money in the
long run since the salary cap is based on the total revenues of the league.

VII.

What learned and What's Next

From all of the previous literature I was able to find on this topic, I never found anything
like my study. No one proposed the question that I asked in the way that I did. There are a lot
of studies about individual performance and pay, but I never found any that were done after
the lockout when the salary cap was implemented. I was able to use all of the previous
research to develop my model by seeing which variables they used to explain player
performance. I found that the conclusions that these studies came to were not the same
conclusions that my study showed. I found that older players are still generally compensated
for their years but not by as much as they used to be due to the salary limits, but found that
inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution was not more important to positive
outcomes. This is because teams cannot afford to pay players huge salaries anymore so the
salaries are more balanced on teams now instead of having large extreme differences.

With the salary cap and revenue sharing, the goal was to develop parity in the league
and give each team an equal chance to succeed, which seems evident that this occurred based
on my study. There are lagged effects with this study, and in the future with more years of data
the benefits of the salary cap and revenue sharing can be shown empirically more.
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My study/model is not perfect and there is room for improvement. There are probably
some other variables that could be included that I did not think of. I tried other variables in
previous models but ended up removing them because they did not make the model any better
and caused problems with the variables being correlated. With including more variables that
would make the model better would increase the R-SQUARED.

I would love to see other studies that assess the salary cap in the NHL econometrically
so that I could compare my results to theirs since I did not find any type of study like mine. If I
were to continue this and expand upon it I would love to do the study for other professional
sports leagues that do not have a salary cap and be able to answer the question "does money
buy championships"
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IX.

Appendix

A-1 : These are descriptive statistics for the regression where POINTS is the dependent variable before the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
SHOTSAGAINST

POINTS

ATTENDANCE

AVGAGE

AVGAGESQ

PENALTYKILL

POWERPLAY

RELSALARY

TOPPAID

LNYEARS

STANLEYCUP

SHOTS

Mean

86.69

681956.60

26.84

721.95

83.79

16.18

1.00

0.83

3.17

0.17

28.01

28.05

Median

91.00

684981.00

26.64

709.69

83.75

15.95

0.89

0.00

3.40

0.00

28.05

28.00

Maximum

116.00

847586.00

29.88

892.81

87.80

23.80

1.82

4.00

4.47

2.00

32.10

35.50

Minimum

54.00

486961.00

24.32

591.46

77.20

10.60

0.40

0.00

0.69

0.00

23.70

22.50

Std. Dev.

15.15

87463.03

1.24

67.76

2.09

2.56

0.37

1.17

0.93

0.46

1.80

2.65

Skewness

-0.28

-0.20

0.61

0.71

-0.39

0.44

0.55

1.17

-0.61

2.78

-0.23

0.41

Observations

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

A-2: These are descriptive statisltics for the regression where POINTS is the dependent variable after the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
POINTS

ATTENDANCE

AVGAGE

AVGAGESQ

PENALTYKILL

POWERPLAY

RELSALARY

TOPPAID

LNYEARS

STANLEYCUP

SHOTS

Mean

91.27

700050.60

26.88

723.18

82.42

17.59

1.00

0.84

3.34

0.17

29.71

29.71

Median

93.00

691779.00

26.77

716.37

82.35

17.85

1.02

1.00

3.50

0.00

29.50

29.65

124.00

872194.00

29.29

857.90

87.40

22.80

1.38

3.00

4.50

1.00

34.30

35.10

1.61

0.00

26.70

24.60

Maximum

SHOTSAGAINST

Minimum

56.00

513345.00

25.00

625.00

77.90

11.80

0.55

0.00

Std. Dev.

14.47

88145.43

0.96

52.14

2.47

2.52

0.16

0.75

0.77

0.37

1.89

2.25

Skewness

-0.36

-0.14

0.42

0.50

-0.10

-0.13

-0.33

0.58

-0.32

1.79

0.51

-0.01

Observations

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00
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A-3: These are descriptive statistics for the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable before the 2004-05 NHL
Lockout
REVENUES

ATTEN DA N CE

AVG TICPRICE

CANADIAN

PRO SPO RTS

TOPPAID

YEARS

POINTS

G O ALFO R

33.86

86.69

214.33

Mean

71.21

681956.60

42.12

0.20

1.90

0.83

M edian

66.00

684981.00

41.70

0.00

2.00

0.00

30.00

91.00

213.00

M axim um

118.00

847586.00

57.11

1.00

5.00

4.00

87.00

116.00

269.00

M inim um

42.00

486961.00

27.72

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.00

54.00

164.00

Std. Dev.

19.68

87463.03

7.81

0.40

1.31

1.17

25.69

15.15

24.81

Skew ness

0.76

-0.20

0.16

1.50

0.19

1.17

0.89

-0.28

0.19

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

O bservations

A-4: These are descriptive statistics for the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable after the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
REVENUES
Mean

82.78

ATTEN DA N CE
700050.60

AVG TICPRICE
44.35

CANADIAN
0.20

PROSPORTS
1.90

TO PPAID

YEARS

POINTS

GO ALFO R

0.84

36.74

91.27

235.73
236.50

M edian

77.50

691779.00

43.68

0.00

2.00

1.00

33.00

93.00

M axim um

160.00

872194.00

88.32

1.00

5.00

3.00

90.00

124.00

312.00

M inim um

56.00

513345.00

25.41

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.00

56.00

189.00

Std. Dev.

19.66

88145.43

10.70

0.40

1.31

0.75

25.59

14.47

26.50

Skew ness

1-52

-0.14

0.94

1.50

0.19

0.58

0.90

-0.36

0.44

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

90.00

O bservations
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A-9: This graph demonstrates why the independent variable AVGAGESQ was included in the regression. It represents that there is
diminishing skills as age increases.
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A-10: This graph demonstrates why the independent variable LNYEARS was included in the regression. It represents that the more
years a team has been in a city the more they will make in revenues until a certain point where the graph will level off.
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X.

Glossary of Terms
National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA) - is the labor union for the
professional hockey players in the National Hockey League
National Hockey League (NHL) - a professional men's ice hockey league started on
November 22, 1917 that currently contains 30 teams in the U.S. and Canada.
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) - A written agreement or contract that is the
result of negotiations between an employer and a union. It sets out the conditions of
employment (wages, hours, benefits, etc.) and ways to settle disputes arising during
the term of the contract
Salary Cap - the maximum amount of money that can be spent on salaries for a sports
team
Revenue Sharing - The sharing of overall team revenues amongst the other teams in the
National Hockey League. Those teams that are eligible for the revenue sharing are, (1) are
ranked in the bottom half (bottom 15) in League revenues, and (2) operate in markets
with a Demographic Market Area of 2.5 million or fewer TV households.
Econometrics - the application of mathematics and statistics to the study of economic
and financial data
Points - The method by which teams are ranked in the National Hockey League, the
combination of wins -2 points, ties (before 2004) - 1 point, overtime loss - 1 point, and
shootout loss - 1 point
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Lockout- is like a strike, with the employer stopping its employees from working, to
put pressure on the labor union.
Penalty Kill - The situation your team is in when someone from your team has committed a
penalty and has to sit in the penalty box. Your team will have one less player on the ice than
the other team so your team is at a disadvantage.
Power Play -The situation your team is in when the opposing team has committed a penalty
and has to sit in the penalty box. Your team will have one more player on the ice than the
other team so your team is at an advantage.
Plus/Minus - The goal differential for a specific player while they are on the ice. If a goal is
scored while they are on the ice by their team they would be a +1. If a goal is scored while they
are on the ice by the other team they would be a -1. The plus/minus is not affected for when
either team is on the power play.
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